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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper assesses the level of financial intermediation in the South African financial 
industry and the reasons for these levels of intermediation. Different banking 
intermediation measures are considered and mostly reflect disintermediation during 
the 1993 to 2009 period. Panel regressions are run to assess which economic factors 
had the biggest impact on intermediation by SA’s four largest banks (Absa Bank, 
Standard Bank of South Africa, Firstrand Bank and Nedbank). It is found that bank 
intermediation was impacted by bank size, profitability, as well as the level of 
competition and client relationships. The level of financial intermediation in SA has 
been low, negatively impacting on banks intermediation ability, and possibly 
impeding government and corporate sectors’ investment and economic activity. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African (SA) banking industry is dominated by four banks, which held an 
average of 77.98% of the industry’s assets between 1993 and 2009 (SARB DI900 and 
BA900 reports), consequently endowing these banks with significant market power. 
The ownership of these four banks is highly concentrated, owned predominantly by 
big incorporated industrial groups of firms (Ojah, 2005). These groups of firms, of 
which some are largely institutional investors such as insurance and pension funds, 
also own large stakes in other SA corporations possibly creating pressure for the 
banks to transact with these corporations even if these transactions are not the most 
economically efficient; thus, leading to financial disintermediation from the 
perspective of “non-member” firms. To investigate the ownership of the banks, a 
controlling shareholder is defined as holding 5% of the voting rights in the bank (La 
Porta, et al., 1999) and a shareholder breakdown for each bank is sourced.  
 
Financial disintermediation, as suggested by Ojah (2005), is where banks receive 
deposits from a small pool of individuals and corporations, many of whom are their 
shareholders, and provide loans to these same individuals and corporations. Thus 
restricting capital to firms and individuals on the outside of this circle of depositors 
and borrowers and/or increasing these outsiders’ cost of capital. The literature 
reviewed shows that financial development and economic activity is closely aligned, 
with Rajan and Zingales (1998) finding financial development has a substantial 
supportive influence on the rate of economic growth as it decreases firms’ cost of 
external finance, while Levine (2002) finds financial development is strongly 
associated with economic growth. 
 
The dominance of the top four banks in the SA banking sector creates an environment 
that is short of competition. Greater competition could force banks to compete 
aggressively for deposits and thus provide loans at the lower end of the market, for 
example, in order to obtain increased market share, increasing banking efficiency and 
access to loans for most individuals and firms. Maudos and de Guevara (2007) find 
that the welfare gains associated with a reduction of banks’ market power are greater 
than the loss of banking cost efficiency, which in turn boosts economic growth while 
diminishing income inequality in the economy. To investigate the level of competition 
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in the SA banking industry, data will be analysed to compile the percentage of total 
industry deposits held and loans provided by each bank. The South African Reserve 
Bank’s (SARB) DI900 and BA900 are a good source for this data.  
 
To investigate the level of disintermediation in the South African banking sector, a 
number of intermediation measures are compiled for each of the top five banks, total 
of the top four and five banks, total of the medium and small sized banks, as well as 
total for the industry. The SARB’s DI900 (1993-2007) and BA900 (2008 and 2009) 
bank returns, which collect data from individual banks on different asset and liability 
classes, are a good source for this data.  
 
The level of intermediation by the total SA financial sector including banks, pension 
and provident funds, insurers and unit trusts (collective investment schemes) are also 
assessed. A comparable intermediation ratio will be compiled for each of the banks, 
pension and provident funds, insurers and unit trust, industries. The level of financial 
intermediation in the whole of the SA financial industry could dictate banks’ financial 
intermediation ability. The SARB online statistical database and banks DI900 and 
BA900 returns are a good source for this data.  
 
Banks often require firms to provide collateral, a credit history and/or a business plan 
when applying for a loan. Some of these requirements if overly stringent can lead to 
the exclusion of many applicants (Hawkins, 2002). SA’s historic discriminatory 
policies, high bank account fees and high capital costs can also be leading to the 
exclusion of applicants. Hawkins (2002) outlines the spectrum of financial provision, 
ranging from the super-included to the included, the fringe and the excluded. The 
super-included and included categories are likely to encompass major bank 
shareholders as well as large, listed corporations, who have easy or almost unlimited 
access to funds. The fringe and excluded categories mainly include SMEs, 
particularly start ups, which lack proof of income and history of operation or those 
excluded on the grounds of inability to service loans due to their high cost. 
 
SA banks’ ownership structure, the lack of competition in the banking industry, 
historical discriminatory policies, applicants’ inability to meet normal loan 
requirements and the high cost of debt, raise the spectre of possible disintermediation 
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in the SA banking industry. The implications of disintermediation are far reaching, 
restricting the ability of SMEs to source capital for expansion, thereby diminishing 
employment and economic growth. Disintermediation could also increase the cost of 
attracting funding for banks, as small depositors are paid lower interest rates than 
larger depositors, who have negotiating power.  
 
This study aims to analyse the level of disintermediation in the SA banking industry 
and the factors influencing intermediation, as well as the impact of intermediation 
(disintermediation) on SA’s economic activity. Therefore a panel regression of the 
four largest banks’ financial intermediation measure is run on banks’ assets as a 
percentage of the total industry, number of branches, capital ratio, number of 
employees and bank margin of interest bearing assets. The study contributes to the 
limited literature on SA financial development and the likelihood of disintermediation 
in the banking industry, which can, in turn, impact on overall economic growth. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature shows that financial development and economic activity are closely 
aligned, while reflecting banks as special kinds of financial intermediaries that 
support economic development. Banks create funds, decrease transaction costs, 
monitor borrowers, transform assets, create liquidity and act as risk managers. Within 
the literature banks’ financial intermediation role and their impact on financial 
markets, economic development and production is reviewed.  
  
1 The role of financial intermediaries in supporting economic activity 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) find financial development has a substantial supportive 
influence on the rate of economic growth, playing a beneficial role in the rise of new 
firms. Levine (2002) finds financial development is strongly associated with 
economic growth. Financial intermediation, when funds are transferred from surplus 
savings units (usually households) to deficit savings units (usually the corporate and 
government sectors), is undertaken in financial markets by financial intermediaries. 
Financial intermediaries provide external funds to non-financial firms, enabling firms 
to invest beyond their current resources and leading to increased economic activity 
(Mishkin, 2007). Financial intermediaries also transform the quality of capital with 
respect to maturities and risks, putting capital to more efficient use (Santomero, 1984; 
Schmidt, et al., 1999).  
 
Financial intermediaries fall into three categories, namely depository institutions, 
contractual savings institutions and investment intermediaries.  
 
Commercial banks are the largest depository institutions, accepting deposits from 
individuals and institutions (checkable, savings and time deposits) and making loans 
(commercial, consumer, mortgage, etc.) to them. Santomero (1984) finds demand 
deposits, issued largely by banks, play a central role in the economy as a medium of 
exchange, which facilitates trade. Mutual savings banks (saving societies) are another 
type of depository institution, which accept a large range of deposits and provide 
loans, although largely restricted to residential mortgage loans. A further type of 
depository institution is a credit union, a small cooperative lending institution 
5 
 
organised around a particular group (for example the employees of a firm) that issues 
consumer loans, which are funded by deposits called shares. Depository institutions 
increase the availability of funds for investment and consumption by firms and 
individuals, thereby increasing economic activity. 
 
Contractual savings institutions acquire funds on a periodic basis as set out in a 
contract, while making pay-outs at an estimated date, diminishing liquidity constraints 
and facilitating long-term investments in assets like bonds and equities (Mishkin, 
2007). Life and short-term insurers are the most well known contractual savings 
institutions. Life insurers insure people against the financial obligations following a 
death or provide an annuity post-retirement. Short-term insurers insure policyholders’ 
property against loss from theft, fire and accident, and also provide health insurance. 
Reinsurers insure long- and short-term insurers against unforeseen large pay-outs. 
Private and public pension and provident funds are other types of contractual savings 
institutions, which provide retirement income to employees in the form of annuities or 
a once off payment. Monthly contributions by employees and employers are made to 
the fund, which in turn invests these in long-term assets (Mishkin, 2007). Contractual 
savings institutions boost overall investment in equity and bond markets, increasing 
the capital funds available to individual firms, thus increasing potential investment 
and economic activity. 
 
Investment intermediaries include finance companies, mutual funds, money market 
mutual funds and investment banks. Finance companies provide loans to individuals 
(for vehicles, furniture and home improvements) and small businesses, funded by the 
issuing of stocks and bonds. Mutual funds sell shares to individuals, pool these funds 
to purchase diversified portfolios of stocks and bonds, decreasing transaction costs 
through economies of scale for individuals while providing firms with investment 
funds. Money market mutual funds are a special type of mutual fund that only invests 
in money market instruments. Investment banks may act as deal makers in mergers 
and acquisitions, while also providing advisory services to corporations when issuing 
stocks or bonds, underwriting the securities and reselling them in the market 
(Mishkin, 2007). Investment intermediaries boost firms’ current purchasing and 
investment power by increasing the capital funds available, buoying economic 
activity. 
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Financial intermediation, as suggested by Allen and Santomero (1998),  can transfer 
economic resources through time, allowing future profits to pay for current 
consumption (e.g. bank and finance company loans), increasing current potential 
investment, or allowing current savings to increase future consumption (e.g. insurers 
and pension and mutual funds). Financial intermediaries, like banks, are also risk 
managers, evaluating credit risk for uninformed depositors or shareholders, thereby 
improving investment returns (Allen and Santomero, 1998; Santomero, 1984).  
 
2 Why banks are best suited to the role of financial intermediation 
 
Banks are special kinds of financial intermediaries which are particularly able to 
create funds, reduce transaction costs and information asymmetries, develop 
beneficial relationships, monitor borrowers, transform assets, create liquidity and act 
as risk mangers.  Schumpeter (1934) defined banks as uniquely able to add to the 
existing stock of money by lending money created by claims on their liabilities, while 
Bossone (2001) found that other financial intermediaries mainly reallocate existing 
liquidity. Banks can finance new production by creating money, through lending that 
can yield real output ex-ante, thereby mobilising real resources for production, 
increasing economic activity. 
 
Banks reduce transaction costs through brokerage services, which bring together 
providers and users of capital essentially by transforming assets (claims). Banks have 
a cost advantage in information production that decreases transaction costs, as private 
information can be gathered on borrowers that deposit funds with the same bank 
(Bossone, 2001). Banks establish long-term relationships with borrowers, providing a 
steady and reliable supply of funding for borrowers and generating for themselves 
safe sources of rents. This facilitates banks’ funding and decreases their cost of doing 
so, increasing the amount of funding available and thereby economic activity. 
Gathering of information about a borrower may provide an insider’s view on the 
borrower’s investment and decrease the banks’ problems of adverse selection (bad 
credit risk borrowers are most likely to apply for loans) and moral hazard (borrowers 
may engage in undesirable activities that make it less likely that the loan will be 
repaid). Therefore bank loans diminish information asymmetries and thus enhance 
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aggregate investment and economic activity (Diamond, 1984; Bhattacharya and 
Thakor, 1993).  
 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) found banks transform assets by financing illiquid 
loans with liquid deposits in an environment where random shocks affect preferences 
for the timing of consumption, providing a riskless claim while lending to risky 
entrepreneurs. Banks transform large denominated financial assets into smaller units, 
which are thereby more accessible to small borrowers (Santomero, 1984).  
 
Hakens (2004) highlighted the role of banks as risk managers, including analysing 
and controlling (through hedging tools) risk, and then granting loans to entrepreneurs. 
Through risk transfer and sharing, banks mobilise risk-averse investors, transforming 
deposits into loans, increasing the amount of funds available in the economy and 
boosting economic activity (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Santomero, 1984). 
 
3 Policies, laws and regulations that support financial intermediation 
 
Informational frictions that create a role for financial intermediaries also generate 
instability: for example, when deposits are withdrawn unexpectedly and/or assets are 
liquidated prematurely. Policies, laws and regulations relating to the financial sector 
aim to reduce instability and decrease moral hazard, although, as will be discussed 
below, other problems may be created (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). 
 
   3.1 Direct regulation 
Governments, usually via their central banks, provide safety nets to depositors 
through deposit insurance and by being the lender of last resort. In the case of a bank 
failure, deposit insurance ensures the central bank either pays depositors or 
reorganises the bank through a merger with another. Deposit insurance can prevent 
bank runs as it provides an incentive for depositors to keep their funds in the bank 
until needed for consumption as the risk of total loss is diminished (Bhattacharya and 
Thakor, 1993). As a lender of last resort the central bank provides funds to banks to 
bring them back from the brink of collapse (Mishkin, 2007). The central bank’s 
provision of deposit insurance and being a lender of last resort can, however, lead to 
problems like bank instability, moral hazard (banks provide more risky loans as they 
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will be supported by the central bank in the event of default) and adverse selection 
(banks have a decreased incentive to monitor loans) (Mishkin, 2007; Kane, 1989). 
Also banks need to set aside funds which could be provided as loans to pay for 
deposit insurance to the central bank. 
 
Other forms of direct regulation include official restrictions on banks’ holding of risky 
assets like equities and banks’ diversification into other financial activities, stunting 
bank development, financial intermediation potential and possibly diminishing 
economic growth (Barth, et al. 2004). Barth, et al. (2004) sets out the theoretical 
reasons for restricting banking activities, which include conflicts of interest, increased 
moral hazard incentive and decreased ability of regulators to monitor and discipline 
more complex banks. By contrast their argument for allowing banks to undertake 
universal operations include exploring economies of scope and scale and diversifying 
income streams, creating more stable banks. There may also be limits on borrowing to 
specific parties and mandated funding to a specific production area, which may have 
positive welfare effects but decrease financial intermediation and the universal 
availability of funds. 
 
Bank supervision, including reports to authorities on the banks’ assets and liabilities 
and visits by bank examiners, another type of direct regulation, increase the cost of 
financial intermediation and resources needed to intermediate, but boost public 
confidence in financial intermediaries (Mishkin, 2007).  However, Barth, et al. (2004) 
find powerful bank supervisors may exert a negative influence on banks’ performance 
as they may extract bribes and depending on their ability to monitor banks, may 
hinder banks’ performance.  
 
Government ownership of banks, another type of direct regulation, is aimed at 
promoting socially desirable investments, but may result in the facilitation of 
politically attractive projects and not economically efficient ones (Barth, et al. 2004). 
Increased government ownership is associated with restricted banking sector activities 
and competition, increased bank crises and decreased private sector monitoring; while 
more private sector oriented approaches to regulation tend to lead to greater bank 
development and efficiency and improved performance (Barth, et al. 2004). More 
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efficient and better developed financial intermediaries tend to increase the availability 
of funds for investment and thereby economic growth potential. 
 
   3.2 Indirect regulation 
Indirect regulation of the financial system includes bank minimum reserve and capital 
requirements, private sector monitoring of banks and portfolio restrictions 
(Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993).  
 
Minimum reserve requirements require banks to hold funds (usually a certain 
percentage of their deposits) with the central bank, without earning interest, in order 
to cover its liabilities in the case of failure or insolvency (where a bank’s assets and 
capital are exceeded by its liabilities). In addition to reserve requirements many 
central banks around the world require banks operating in their country to adhere to 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Basel Committee’s Basel II capital 
requirements accord. Basel II has been adopted by many countries since the beginning 
of 2008 and has widened the scope of capital that may be used by banks to meet their 
capital requirements.  
 
Basel II aims to address some of the negative effects of capital requirement 
regulations, which Barth, et al. (2004) says include decreased banks’ liquidity 
provision role. Capital requirements are aimed at reducing banks’ incentives to invest 
in riskier assets, but may not be sufficient on their own and may even lead to more 
risky activities, including greater outside equity, which increases moral hazard as 
managers have a smaller stake in the bank that they run (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 
1993). These minimum reserve and capital requirements allow the government to 
avoid the cost of bank failures and boosts public confidence in the banking industry 
(Mishkin, 2007).  
 
Banks may also be exposed to indirect regulation through private sector monitoring, 
as defined by Barth, et al. (2004), including adherence to strict accounting practices 
and scrutiny by ratings agencies, which is found to be positively related to bank 
development, but may diverge bank resources away from its core intermediation role. 
Also proposals for new banks may be screened by authorities to prevent undesirable 
people from running banks, while some central banks restrict the entry of new banks 
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and foreign ownership of large local banks. However, Mishkin (2007) found restricted 
competition tends to lead to increased consumer account charges and decreased 
banking efficiency. Restricting foreign and domestic bank entry is found to be 
associated with bank fragility, hindering bank development (Barth, et al. 2004). 
 
 
4 Factors that impede the financial intermediation function of banks 
 
Banks’ financial intermediary role may be limited by a number of factors including 
regulations, policies and financial market and macroeconomic conditions. Regulations 
requiring banks to hold a percentage of their deposits with the central bank to back 
their capital in the case of default (minimum reserve requirements) and holding a 
percentage of their assets as capital (Basel II accord capital requirements) decrease 
depositors’ risks. However, the availability of funds to borrowers is decreased, as is 
banks’ ability to create funds and provide liquidity (Mishkin, 2007). Policies or 
regulations, which mandate funding to a specific production area or limit deposits and 
borrowing to specific parties, decrease banks’ diversification, profits and their ability 
to intermediate.  
 
Bossone (2001) found the development of financial market infrastructure, providing 
individuals with better information, can result in a diminished role for banks as a 
decline in information asymmetries lead investors to prefer higher yielding asset 
classes such as equity. Also an increase in inflation could increase demand for other 
higher yielding assets, in place of bank offered deposits and investments, thus 
decreasing the importance of banks in financial markets and their ability to 
intermediate, as diversification is diminished. Limits on banks’ brokerage activities, 
increasing the amount of information required to bring down transaction costs, could 
also limit the financial intermediation function of banks. 
 
A relationship-based banking system (financial provision to entities with whom the 
bank has a relationship and therefore has gathered information on) is less amenable to 
financing innovations. Bertocco (2008) found innovations are typically undertaken by 
new entrepreneurs, which source mainly venture capital outside of the banking 
industry. This also limits banks’ financial intermediation role, leading to possible 
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disintermediation. However, relationship banking creates a safe source of funding for 
banks (Bossone, 2001), increasing financial intermediation potential. 
 
The level of competition in the banking industry is likely to impact on intermediation 
ability, as Mishkin (2007) finds bank efficiency decreases along with competition. 
Bank size and market power is found by Bossone (2001) to also affect financial 
intermediation potential, with smaller banks having more limited access to inter-bank 
funds than larger banks, requiring smaller banks to hold greater reserves against their 
assets, constraining their intermediation ability. 
 
5 Possible consequences of the break down in banks’ financial  
intermediation role on financial markets, economic development and  
production 
 
Banks create funds, transform assets, diversify risk, provide liquidity and produce 
information about investment opportunities, boosting the availability of funds for 
industrialisation and contributing to economic growth. All these functions can be 
broadly tied to the intermediation role of banks, a breakdown of which is likely to 
limit the depth of financial markets and thus stunt economic development and 
production. By investing in the industries that generate rapid economic growth and 
pioneering new markets and industries, banks boost economic activity. Banks also 
facilitate exchange and trade, decreasing transaction costs and boosting the potential 
size of the corporate sector and the economy. In the absence of financial 
intermediaries, entrepreneurs would only undertake investments that could be funded 
with current resources, which would diminish investment and economic activity. Also 
funds that do not earn interest, for instance through a bank account, hold an 
opportunity cost, decreasing potential corporate returns, the availability of funds, 
investment capability and economic growth (Da Rin and Hellmann, 2002). 
 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are more dependent on bank finance than large 
firms as larger firms can more easily raise capital through bond and stock issues. Beck 
and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) find that a large SME sector is a characteristic of fast 
growing economies and small firms’ financing obstacles have almost twice the 
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negative effect on annual growth than large firms’ do. Therefore a breakdown of 
banks’ financing of SMEs has a potentially significant impact on economic activity. 
 
During banking crises sectors more dependent on external finance experience less 
growth in value added, number of establishments and capital formation than do 
sectors less dependent on external finance (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008). A breakdown of 
financial intermediation leads to poor economic performance and bank distress, which 
may additionally cause banks to diminish their lending. If bank credit cannot be 
substituted by other sources of finance then projects may be cut back or abandoned, 
creating a downward spiral of bank distress and economic contraction (Dell’Ariccia et 
al., 2008). 
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CHAPTER 3: FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION MEASURES 
 
In this chapter the level of intermediation in the SA financial industry is assessed 
using financial intermediation ratios. For the banking sector these include ratios for 
the total, large, medium and small banks, as well as the top five largest SA banks 
individually. Comparable financial intermediation ratios are then compiled for banks, 
insurers, pension and provident fund and the unit trust industries to assess the level of 
intermediation in the financial sector and what implications this has for intermediation 
in the banking sector. 
 
3.1 Banking sector intermediation ratios 
Ratios have been compiled for the total banking industry, top four banks (which 
constituted 77.98% of banking industry assets during 1993 to 2009) and top five 
banks (which constituted 82.74% of industry assets between 1993 and 2009) at 
aggregated and disaggregated levels, as well as medium and small banks (both 
including and excluding the fifth largest bank), with detailed figures available in 
Tables I to X in the Appendix. The data is sourced from the SARB’s database of 
banks’ DI900 (1993 to 2007) and BA900 (2008 and 2009) returns; from which the 
December data for each year is used
1
.  
 
The first and most unambiguous intermediation measure used for banks is loans 
divided by deposits, which is a clear intermediation measure. Loans include 
instalment sales, mortgages, credit cards, overdrafts and foreign currency loans, as 
well as loans under resale agreements, while deposits include local and foreign 
currency denominated deposits. The ratio reflects the percentage of a bank’s deposits 
that are lent out, which should be at least one hundred percent as banks are uniquely 
able to add to the existing stock of money by lending money created by claims on 
their own liabilities (Schumpeter, 1934). A level above one hundred percent suggests 
intermediation, which as can be seen in Chart 1 was the case for the total banking 
industry in 1996 (100.25%), 2001 (100.17%), 2006 (101.05%) and 2007 (101.99%), 
                                                 
1 Alternatively data from Bankscope, which collates individual banks’ annual financial reports may have been 
used, but these did not add up to the total banking industry data as sourced from the SARB’s DI900 and BA900 
bank returns and therefore do not provide comparable data that can supplement the SARB’s data. This may be a 
result of different financial year-ends employed for the banks in assembling the Bankscope database. 
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while marginally below this level for the remainder of the 1993 to 2009 period (in a 
range between 94.32% and 98.71%). In the United States of America (USA) 
commercial banks’ ratio of loans to deposits was above one hundred percent for all 
but three years (1993, 1994 and 2009) during the 1993 to 2009 period, reflecting clear 
financial intermediation. To compile total USA loans: commercial and industrial, real 
estate, consumer, interbank and other loans and leases were included, while large time 
and other deposits are included in the deposits measure used. The data is sourced from 
the online USA Federal Reserve Bank database. Detailed data for USA commercial 
banks is available in Table XI in the Appendix. 
 
Chart 1- Intermediation measure: loans to deposits for the total banking 
industry, top four banks, and medium and small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
 
The disintermediation in SA’s banking industry in 13 of the 17 years analysed may be 
a result of stringent bank reserve requirements, which necessitate banks hold funds 
with the central bank, without earning interest, in order to cover their liabilities in the 
case of failure. In SA the bank reserve requirement specifies that 2.50% of total assets 
and risk exposures must be covered by the greater of 250 million SA rands or the sum 
of primary, secondary and tertiary share capital as well as primary and secondary 
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unimpaired reserves.
2
  By comparison bank reserve requirements are not enforced in 
the United Kingdom, while in the USA the reserve requirement is 10.00% of 
transaction deposits. 
 
SA banks, in line with many developed and developing economies, are also subject to 
minimum capital requirements under the Basel II Accord, enforced by the SARB 
since January 2008, leading to increased risk management and possibly also 
impacting banks’ ability to intermediate.  However, the SARB enforces more 
stringent requirements than the benchmarks set by the Basel Committee. In SA a 
minimum ratio of equity capital to total assets of 7.00% for Tier I capital is enforced 
(4.00% set by the Basel Committee), 5.25% for core Tier I capital (2.00% set by the 
Basel Committee), while SA limits Tier II capital to one hundred percent of Tier I 
capital (as is the case in the Basel Committee’s requirement) 3.  
 
In addition, the top four SA banks have been operating capital ratios above minimum 
regulatory capital requirements. At end-December 2009, the Tier I capital ratio of 
Absa Bank was 12.70%, Standard Bank of South Africa was 11.80% and Nedbank 
was 11.50%, while that of Firstrand Bank was 12.30% at end-June 2009. These ratios 
                                                 
2 Primary share capital includes capital obtained through the issue of ordinary shares, non-redeemable non-
cumulative preference shares and prescribed categories of preferred securities (hybrid debt instruments).  
Secondary share capital includes a prescribed percentage of capital obtained through the issue of cumulative 
preference shares, as well as ordinary shares or other preference shares resulting from a revaluation of assets or 
primary share capital instruments where the proceeds of such instruments, or any portion thereof, are excluded 
from qualifying as primary share capital as a result of a prescribed limit.  Tertiary share capital includes capital 
obtained by means of unsecured subordinated debt.  Primary unimpaired reserve funds include funds obtained 
from actual earnings or recoveries, premiums on the issue of ordinary or non-redeemable, non-cumulative 
preference shares and a surplus on the realisation of capital assets. Secondary unimpaired reserve funds include 
funds obtained from actual earnings or recoveries, but not disclosed as a general or special reserve in the banks’ 
financial statements. Secondary unimpaired reserve funds also include a prescribed percentage of any surplus 
resulting from a revaluation of assets, a prescribed amount of a reserve held against unidentified and unforeseen 
losses, funds obtained by way of premiums on the issue of cumulative preference shares or debt instruments. Also 
qualifying as secondary unimpaired reserve funds are those funds constituting primary unimpaired reserve funds 
where such funds, or any portion thereof, are excluded from qualifying primary reserve funds as a result of a 
prescribed limit, but excludes any fund required to be maintained in terms of any other law (The Banks Act 1990). 
3 Core Tier I capital includes ordinary shares and disclosed reserves. In addition to core Tier I capital, Tier I capital 
includes non-cumulative, non-redeemable preference shares and hybrid debt instruments. Tier II capital includes 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid instruments and subordinated term debt. 
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are up from the previous year’s 11.60%, 11.00%, 9.60% and 11.10% respectively, 
reflecting Von Thadden’s (2004) expectations for banks’ capital held in excess of 
their capital requirements to increase in economic downturns (2009), while decreasing 
in economic upturns. 
 
In the case of the top four banks, there has been evidence of financial intermediation 
(ratio of loans to deposits above 100%) in only six years (1996, 2000, 2001, 2005, 
2006 and 2007) of the seventeen years of data analysed, while for the medium and 
small banks aggregated only once (2002) in the period 1993 to 2009 is there evidence 
of intermediation (as seen in Chart 1).  A breakdown of the top four banks (see Chart I 
in the Appendix), reflects intermediation in the three largest banks (Absa Bank, the 
Standard Bank of SA and Firstrand Bank, with corresponding average 22.59%, 
22.17% and 17.76% of banking industry assets during 1993 to 2009), while the fourth 
biggest bank Nedbank’s (with average 15.46% of industry assets during 1993 to 
2009) data reflects disintermediation over the period. The ratio of loans to deposits for 
the fifth largest bank, Investec Bank (with average 4.76% of industry assets during 
1993 to 2009, see Chart II in the Appendix), also reflects a similar picture of 
disintermediation, suggesting medium and small banks were most responsible for 
disintermediation during the study period. 
 
Another reason local banks may have provided financial intermediation below 
potential is their shareholder structure, with many of the banks’ major shareholders 
(over 5.00% shareholding) being local investment managers or corporates, leading to 
preferential access to loans for them. The Public Investment Corporation, the 
dominant manager of most public sector workers’ pensions and provident funds, 
owned 8.57% of Absa Bank, 12.20% of Standard Bank of SA and 5.78% of Nedbank 
at end-December 2009, while holding 8.92% of Firstrand Bank’s ordinary share 
capital as at 30 June 2009. Other majority shareholders of Firstrand Bank are Rand 
Merchant Bank Holdings (effective shareholding of 15.00% at end-June 2009) and 
Remgro Limited (effective shareholding of 16.03% at end-June 2009), both 
investment holding companies. Nedbank’s major shareholder is Old Mutual (52.21% 
as at 31 December 2009), which is an international financial services group with 
operations in SA, providing investment and savings solutions. Absa Bank’s major 
shareholder is Barclays (55.52% shareholding at 31 December 2009), which is a 
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United Kingdom based bank, while that of the Standard Bank of SA is the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (20.10% shareholding at 31 December 2009), the 
world’s largest bank by market capitalisation4, which is based in China. 
 
As in other countries, banks also need to adhere to scrutiny by ratings agencies, 
accounting standards, while making disclosures of information on banks’ financial 
performance and compliance with minimum capital, reserve and liquid asset 
requirements
5
 to the Registrar of Banks and the public (Regulation 43 of regulations 
relating to banks as part of the Government Gazette No. 30629, 1 January 2008). This 
could direct resources away from core banking activities, possibly limiting 
intermediation. The National Credit Act (NCA, Act No. 34 of 2005) effective from 1 
June 2007, introduced more stringent conditions to credit provision, including a more 
holistic look at the affordability of credit for the consumer, limiting banks’ ability to 
freely provide loans and increasing banks’ costs of assessing loan applications. The 
data analysed suggests the NCA had little impact on financial intermediation in the 
total SA banking industry, with the ratio of financial intermediation rising in 2007. 
However, the subsequent global financial crisis and economic recession are likely to 
have contributed towards the fall in financial intermediation in 2008 and 2009. 
 
The second intermediation measure compiled for banks is loans divided by liabilities
6
, 
which is the percentage of a bank’s total liabilities that are lent out, a broader 
intermediation measure than the loans to deposits ratio. The loans to liabilities 
measure is expected to be around one hundred percent, but below the loans to deposits 
intermediation measure as the denominator, liabilities, is greater than the 
denominator, deposits. As can be seen in Chart 2, for the total banking industry in the 
period 1993 to 2009 70.12% to 81.76% of banks’ liabilities were lent out. This ratio 
for the top four banks (between 70.14% and 83.70% during 1993 to 2009) has been 
mostly higher than that for the total industry, while that of medium and small banks 
(between 65.51% and 84.25% during 1993 and 2009) has tended to be lower than the 
                                                 
4 Source: www.icbc-ltd.com 
5
 SA banks are required to have liquid assets greater than or equal to the sum of a prescribed percentage of the sum 
of their liabilities. 
6 Liabilities include deposits, other borrowed funds, foreign currency funding, derivatives issued and other trading 
liabilities. 
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total industry. These ratios have followed a mostly downward trend since 1993, 
suggesting diminishing intermediation in a period that would have been expected to 
have seen increased intermediation due to the end of the apartheid political regime, 
providing improved working opportunities for a larger portion of the population, 
increasing loan demand and the value of deposits amid broader access to financial 
services. 
 
Chart 2- Intermediation measure: loans to liabilities for the total banking 
industry, top four banks and medium and small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
 
A breakdown of the top four banks (see Chart III in the Appendix) and aggregated 
medium and small banks reflects extreme volatility, with many of the top four banks’ 
loans to liabilities ratio below the total for extended periods. SA’s fifth largest bank 
Investec Bank’s ratio of loans to liabilities (see Chart IV in the Appendix) has been 
even more volatile.  
 
SA has always had stringent reserve and capital requirements and a highly regulated 
financial sector, likely sheltering the local financial sector from the 2008/2009 USA 
sub-prime debt crisis and resultant global financial crisis, however, these regulations 
may be hindering banks’ ability to intermediate. In addition to the factors outlined 
above that impact on the banking industry’s intermediation ability, low levels of 
competition in the sector may also be adversely affecting banks’ intermediation role. 
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Companies (local and foreign) require SARB authorisation to operate in the financial 
sector and a huge fee is payable for the SARB to process applications, diminishing 
competition in the sector. The low competition is reflected in the top four banks 
operating in SA holding 77.98% of the industry’s assets, 79.90% of loans and 78.56% 
of deposits. Limits on banks’ investments and loans, including in immovable 
property, subsidiaries or in debentures or preference shares of subsidiaries may not 
exceed the sum of primary capital and primary reserves (Banks Act 1990), possibly 
also limiting banks’ ability to intermediate.  
 
The third, but much less representative, intermediation measure used is total assets 
less fixed assets and cash (represented by SA bank notes and coins on banks’ balance 
sheets), divided by deposits, essentially the earning assets of the bank relative to 
deposits. As can be seen in Chart 3, for the total banking industry in the period 1993 
to 2009 124.09% to 149.07% of banks’ earning assets could be said to be supported 
by deposits (if deposits were the only inputs of the banks). This intermediation ratio 
followed a gradual upward trend between 1993 and 2002, while trending down from 
2003 to 2009. The trend down in the 2003 to 2009 period is possibly due to increased 
investment alternatives for individuals’ funds, including equities, mutual funds, unit 
trusts and exchange traded funds, despite banks’ off-balance sheet operations, 
including securitisation, increasing banks’ potential lending. SA banks did most of 
their securitisation transactions during the 2005 to 2009 period (The Banking 
Association of South Africa, 2010).  
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Chart 3- Intermediation measure: total assets less fixed assets and cash to 
deposits for the total banking industry, top four banks and medium and small 
banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
 
Total assets less fixed assets and cash divided by deposits is a broader and less 
representative intermediation measure than the loans to deposits ratio and therefore 
the average of this ratio (133.13%) is much higher than the 109.30% average of the 
loans to deposits measure in the period 1993 to 2009. Another intermediation measure 
of total assets less fixed assets and cash divided by liabilities during the 1993 to 2009 
period ranged between 102.81% and 107.78%, lower than the total assets less fixed 
assets and cash to deposits ratio as the liabilities denominator is larger than the 
deposits denominator. 
 
The ratio of total assets less fixed assets and cash to deposits for the top four banks (in 
a range between 119.76% and 147.75% during 1993 to 2009) has been below that for 
the total industry for most of the period, while that of medium and small banks 
(130.05% to 154.75% during 1993 to 2009) has been significantly higher than the 
total. The breakdown of the ratio of total assets less fixed assets and cash to deposits 
of the top four banks (Chart V in the Appendix) and aggregated medium and small 
banks reflects an interesting picture with Nedbank and Absa Bank’s ratios close to but 
below the total industry for most of the 1993 to 2009 period. FirstRand Bank’s ratio 
was very volatile and above that for the total industry for extended periods and 
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Standard Bank of SA’s ratio was close to that for the total industry between 1993 and 
2002, but then far above the total from 2003 to 2009, reflecting the experience of 
larger banks in the US that have to borrow to boost their potential lending (i.e., like 
money centre banks); thus, reflecting less dependence on deposits. This suggests 
Nedbank and Absa Bank acquired funds from other sources, but these banks have 
similar branch networks to those of the other two large banks (Firstrand Bank and 
Standard Bank of SA). Therefore the funds may have been from their concentrated 
shareholder base, with both Nedbank and Absa Bank having a single largest 
shareholder with a greater than fifty percent holding.  
 
Looking at the ratio of total assets less fixed assets and cash to liabilities for the top 
four banks (Chart VI in the Appendix), Nedbank’s ratio is close to, but above that for 
the total industry during the 2001 to 2008 period. This suggests Nedbank relied less 
on its liabilities; that is, liabilities other than deposits of foreign currency funding, 
derivatives issued and trading liabilities, in the period than the average bank and more 
on its deposits as collateral for its earning assets. This may be a result of sufficient 
deposit taking due to relationship banking, particularly from a large shareholder like 
Old Mutual (52.2% shareholding in Nedbank at 31 December 2009).  
 
Standard Bank of SA’s ratio of earning assets to liabilities was mostly below that of 
the total industry in contrast to its earning assets to deposits ratio that was around or 
below that of the total industry in the 1993 to 2003 period and then far above in the 
2004 to 2009 period. A similar contrast is seen by FirstRand Bank’s ratio in the 1993 
to 2003 period, with the ratio of earning assets to liabilities mostly below that of the 
total industry and the ratio of earning assets to deposits above the total.  
 
This discrepancy suggests the Standard Bank of SA and FirstRand Bank are more 
reliant on liabilities to back their earning assets. Absa’s ratio of earning assets to 
liabilities compared to the total industry acts similarly to its ratio of earning assets to 
deposits compared to the total industry, i.e. remaining mostly below that of the total 
industry during the period analysed. Nedbank appears to be a more money centred 
bank, followed by Firstrand Bank, than the other large SA banks, i.e. more reliant on 
deposits, which may also be a reflection of their size, smaller than the other top four 
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SA banks. Internationally larger banks are typically less money centred as they are 
more easily able to raise funds from other sources like debt and equity. 
 
The fourth intermediation measure used is loans plus deposits divided by total assets, 
essentially a banking operational efficiency measure, which would be expected to 
exceed one hundred percent. As can be seen in Chart 4, for the total banking industry 
in the period 1993 to 2009, banks’ loans and deposits exceeded their total assets by 
between 1.31 and 1.53 times. The ratio has mostly trended down in this period, 
suggesting SA banks’ operational efficiency has deteriorated, likely a result of many 
alternative financial products available to depositors. This ratio for the top four banks 
(131.33% to 158.03% during 1993 to 2009) has been above or close to that for the 
total industry, while that of medium and small banks (125.02% to 147.86% during 
1993 to 2009) has mostly been below that of the total industry, suggesting larger 
banks are more operationally efficient than medium and small banks.  
 
Chart 4- Intermediation measure: loans and deposits to total assets for the total 
banking industry, top four banks and medium and small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
 
A breakdown of the top four banks (Chart VII in the Appendix) and aggregated 
medium and small banks, reflects a mixed picture with Absa Bank’s intermediation 
ratio of loans plus deposits to total assets far above the total industry for most of the 
period under review, Nedbank’s mostly above, while Standard Bank of SA and 
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Firstrand Bank’s ratios have been close to the total banking industry ratio or below. 
Small and medium banks’ loans and deposits covered less of their total assets than 
that of the total industry in the period. 
 
3.2 Financial sector intermediation ratios 
 
The level of intermediation in the total SA financial sector including banks, pension 
and provident funds, insurers and unit trusts (collective investment schemes) is also 
assessed, with a comparable ratio compiled for each of these industries within the 
sector. For banks the ratio is one of loans and marketable securities to total assets, 
essentially banks’ earning assets relative to total assets7. This is compared to pension 
and provident funds, total insurers and unit trusts’ marketable securities, which 
constitute most of these firms’ earning assets, relative to their total assets. The ratios 
are included in Chart 5, while detailed data is available in Table XII in the Appendix. 
 
Chart 5- Intermediation measures: ratio of loans and marketable securities to 
total assets for the total banking industry, as well as the ratio of marketable 
securities to total assets for pension and provident funds, insurers and the unit 
trust industry 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
                                                 
7 A better denominator for the intermediation measures, reflecting total industry intermediation more clearly, 
would have been the “input variable”, total liabilities, but they were unavailable for other industries (insurers, 
pension and provident funds and unit trusts). 
24 
 
 
The data was sourced from the SARB’s online statistical database, which has 
comparable data from 1992 to 2008
8
. 
 
To compile the above ratio for the banking industry, banking institutions’ total loans 
and advances and total investments and bills discounted are computed relative to 
banking institutions’ total assets. As can be seen in Chart 5, the ratio suggests that 
between 71.94% and 82.20% of banks’ total assets in the 1992 to 2008 period was 
either lent out or invested. This suggests that banks have not used their assets to their 
full potential (loans plus marketable securities at least one hundred percent of total 
assets), as banks are uniquely able to add to the existing stock of money by lending 
money created by claims on their own debt (Schumpeter, 1934), while below potential 
investment in corporates’ fixed income securities and equities limits companies’ 
ability to expand and invest, limiting economic activity.  This ratio has mostly been 
stable in a narrow range during the 1992 to 2008 period. 
 
To compile the marketable securities to total assets ratio for the pension and provident 
fund industry, the marketable securities of official as well as private self-administered 
pension and provident funds are used. The marketable securities include central 
government, local governments, public enterprises and others’ fixed interest 
securities, as well as ordinary shares. Official and private self-administered pension 
and provident funds’ total assets are added to get the total assets for the pension and 
provident fund industry.  As can be seen in graph 5, the ratio has been in a narrow 
range between 78.55% and 88.75% during the 1992 to 2008 period, reflecting 
relatively low investment of pension and provident funds’ total assets. Pension and 
provident funds’ investments have possibly been capped by regulations limiting their 
investments in riskier securities and high direct and indirect costs of regulators’ 
supervision (Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 and as amended).  
 
To compile the ratio for the insurance industry, both long- and short-term insurers’ 
fixed interest securities of government, public enterprises and other assets, as well as 
                                                 
8 The annual reports of the Registrar of Short-Term Insurance, Registrar of Long-Term Insurance, Registrar of 
Pension Funds and Financial Services Board were also assessed, but did not have all the indicators in the time 
period required for the analysis. 
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ordinary shares are included to compile insurers’ marketable securities, which are 
divided by total assets of long- and short-term insurers. As can be seen in graph 5, the 
ratio suggests that between 57.10% and 75.57% of insurers’ total assets in the 1992 to 
2008 period were invested, while grinding lower in the period. Insurers are subject to 
limits on investments within the Long- and Short- term Insurers’ Acts (Long-term 
Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998). The Acts also 
require insurers to provide financial returns to the Registrar on a regular basis, thus 
limiting their intermediation ability as resources need to be directed to this function. 
Insurers are required to hold assets at least covering their liabilities at all times, 
possibly limiting their ability to invest in marketable securities to avoid failing to 
cover claims. This may limit insurers’ investments to below potential (marketable 
securities one hundred percent of total assets) due to a failure to balance funds needed 
for claims with the investment potential of premiums. 
 
To compile the ratio for the unit trust industry the market value of security holdings of 
public sector securities, as well as private preference shares, debentures and ordinary 
shares is divided by unit trusts’ total assets at book value. As can be seen in graph 5, 
the ratio suggests that between 48.43% and 144.35% of unit trusts’ total assets in the 
1992 to 2008 period were invested. Investment restrictions, in particular to liquid 
assets’ exposure (The Unit Trusts Control Act 1981), may be negatively impacting the 
unit trust industry’s ability to invest in risky marketable securities.  
 
The ratio of marketable securities to total assets for the unit trust industry declined 
significantly between 1994 and 1998, likely a result of uncertainty in the economy 
due to a new government, leading investors to prefer less risky assets like cash. This 
ratio mostly rose between 1999 and 2005, impacted by demand for investments due to 
an expanding economy. However, the fall in the ratio between 2006 and 2008 was 
within an economic growth cycle (in 2006 and 2007 SA had economic growth above 
five percent year on year and in 2008 growth was 3.2 percent year on year), possibly 
reflecting the impact of increased alternative investments, some entailing lower costs 
for the investor.  
 
The ratios used for the particular industries within the broader financial services 
sector are not core intermediation ratios but are a representation of intermediation in 
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the SA financial services industry, suggesting intermediation may be too low. This 
suggests banks have been operating in an environment that appears not to foster 
intermediation, perhaps this partially explains the below potential levels of banking 
intermediation. The banking intermediation measures considered mostly reflect 
disintermediation in the 1993 to 2009 period, with the top four banks’ intermediation 
higher than that of the medium and small banks.  
 
Banks’ intermediation has been adversely impacted by high reserve and capital 
requirements (as benchmarked in the Basell II accord), concentrated shareholder base, 
regulatory disclosures, limited competition and limits on investments, among other 
factors. Increased bank lending, as well as investment by bank, insurer, pension and 
provident fund and the unit trust industries in government debt, corporate debt and 
equity would boost the government and corporate sectors’ ability to invest, which 
would contribute towards greater economic growth and job creation. 
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CHAPTER 4: VARIABLES IMPACTING BANKS’ FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION  
 
The intermediation ratios compiled suggest a negative trend in financial 
intermediation in SA, but do not provide insight into the reason for this. Therefore a 
panel regression is run on SA’s four largest banks’ (Absa Bank, Standard Bank of SA, 
FirstRand Bank and Nedbank) financial intermediation measures to assess which 
economic factors are likely to have facilitated financial disintermediation in SA 
between 1993 and 2009. Annual data series are used. Missing data lead to the 
regression being restricted to between 2002 and 2009
9
.  
 
A number of variables (guided by the intermediation ratios considered and the 
literature) were considered as possibly having some impact on SA’s top four banks’ 
financial intermediation: including bank assets as a percentage of that of the total 
industry as a reflection of bank size, market power and competition, as Bossone 
(2001) finds that smaller banks have more limited access to inter-bank funds than 
larger banks, requiring smaller banks to hold greater reserves against their assets, 
constraining their intermediation ability. Also Mishkin (2007) finds decreased 
competition leads to increased account charges and decreased bank efficiency and 
possible lower financial intermediation.  
 
The interest margin between banks’ assets and liabilities, as a reflection of banks’ 
profitability, which is expected to increase banks’ ability to intermediate is also 
considered, with larger interest rate spreads associated with a more concentrated 
banking market (Degryse and Ongena, 2008). Number of branches and employees are 
also considered as a reflection of the extent of the banks’ relationship with clients, 
which creates a safe source of funding for banks (Bossone, 2001), and consequently 
increases financial intermediation potential. Another variable considered is banks’ 
capital ratio (total equity to total assets) as a reflection of banks’ ability to cover their 
assets with their shareholder capital, which is expected to have an inverse relationship 
with banks’ intermediation. That is the greater the amount of equity covering total 
                                                 
9 Capital ratio, number of branches, number of employees and interest margin between banks’ assets and liabilities are test 
variables used in this analysis.  Importantly the banking industry data is made up of Absa Bank, Standard Bank of SA, FirstRand 
Bank and Nedbank, because these top four South African banks have significant pertinent data for this test. 
28 
 
assets, the less funds are available to use for financial intermediation, but a well 
capitalised bank’s financial intermediation potential is expected to be greater than that 
of a weakly capitalised bank. 
 
Data on the annual assets of the individual banks and total industry are sourced from 
the SARB’s DI900 and BA900 reports on banks’ balance sheets. The banks’ annual 
reports were used to source data on the number of branches, number of employees, 
capital ratio and interest margins, with comparable variables across all banks
10
. 
 
An ordinary least squared panel regression is run for the largest four SA banks’ loans 
to deposits intermediation measure on the bank assets as a percentage of the total 
industry assets, number of branches, capital ratio, number of employees and net 
interest margin between the bank’s assets and liabilities. The regression appears to be 
reasonable for drawing inferences because it does not exhibit serial correlation 
between the independent variables, the Durbin Watson statistic is around two (Model 
1, Regression 1 in Table 1).  
 
The regression has a high adjusted R-squared (0.756), with bank assets as a 
percentage of the total industry assets, number of branches and interest margin 
between the bank assets and liabilities variables resulting in significant coefficients, 
which are positive, confirming our expectation that increased bank size, improved 
client-bank relationships (although only a marginal impact as the coefficient is 
0.0002) and higher bank profitability increase banks’ potential financial 
intermediation.  
 
The number of employees and capital ratio variables’ coefficients are insignificant, 
leading to the running of a redundant variables test on these, which results in a failure 
to reject these variables as redundant. The resultant test equation has all significant 
coefficients (bank assets as a percentage of the total industry assets, number of 
branches and interest margin between bank assets and liabilities), a high adjusted R-
squared (0.733) and lacks serial correlation (Durbin-Watson statistic is close to 2 at 
1.9) (Model 2, redundant variable test equation in Table 1).  
                                                 
10 Standardised capital ratio data are sourced from Nedbank Capital’s banking sector analysts 
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Due to the insignificance of the number of employees and capital ratio variables as 
well as a failure to reject these variables as redundant, a restricted least squared 
regression is run for the loans to deposits intermediation measure on bank assets as a 
percentage of that of the total industry, number of branches and interest margin 
between bank assets and liabilities. The regression model (Model 3, restricted 
regression in Table 1) has a high adjusted R-squared (0.706), does not have serial 
correlation (Durbin-Watson statistic is close to 2 at 1.9) and the coefficients of all the 
variables are significant.  
 
The regression suggests bank assets as a percentage of that of the total industry, 
number of branches and interest margin between bank assets and liabilities had a 
significant impact on the loans to deposits intermediation measure during the 2002 to 
2008 period. These set of results suggests that an impact on bank intermediation by 
the bank size, profitability, level of competition and relationships with clients, are 
possible factors that both banks and policy makers can target in attempts to increase 
intermediation (or reverse the trends pointing towards disintermediation). The result is 
as expected from the literature. 
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Table I: Panel models of factors impacting the intermediation of South Africa's top 
four banks 
 
Dependent variable 
is the intermediation 
measure: loans to 
deposits 
Model 1 
 
Regression 1 
Model 2 
Redundant variable 
test equation 
Model 3 
 
Restricted regression 
Bank assets as a 
percentage of total 
industry 1.070 1.603 1.666 
  (2.237) (4.128) (4.237) 
Number of branches  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
  (2.574) (2.552) (2.334) 
Interest margin 
between bank assets 
and liabilities  6.068 6.928 7.289 
  (2.615) (3.042) (3.217) 
Number of 
employees 0.000     
  (1.596)     
Capital ratio -1.432     
  (-0.916)     
Constant 0.431 0.267 0.253 
  (2.315) (2.068) (1.924) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.756 0.733 0.706 
Number of 
observations 28 28 28 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The literature highlights the importance of financial intermediaries in providing funds 
to non-financial firms, enabling investment greater than current resources, with banks 
as special types of intermediaries that are able to create funds, reduce transaction costs 
and information asymmetries, develop beneficial relationships, monitor borrowers, 
transform assets, create liquidity and act as risk mangers.  The literature also 
highlighted the factors that may impede financial intermediation, including 
regulations, bank size, market power, competition levels, inflation levels and extent of 
financial market developments, which could stunt economic activity and investment. 
  
The ratio analysis shows intermediation in the broader SA financial services industry, 
including insurers, the pension and provident fund and unit trust industry, is too low; 
suggesting banks have been operating in an environment that does not necessarily 
foster intermediation, partially explaining the below potential levels of banking 
intermediation. The banking intermediation measures considered mostly reflect 
disintermediation during the 1993 to 2009 period, with the top four banks’ 
intermediation higher than that of the medium and small banks. Banks’ intermediation 
seems to have been adversely impacted by stringent bank regulations (reserve and 
capital requirements), low levels of competition and the shareholding structure of the 
banks. However, the ratio analysis suggests the size of SA banks may be impacting 
their financial intermediation ability, with larger banks locally and in the USA better 
able to intermediate.  
 
The panel regressions conducted to assess which variables have the biggest impact on 
intermediation by SA’s four largest banks, suggest bank assets as a percentage of the 
total industry, number of branches and interest margin between bank assets and 
liabilities had a significant impact on the loans to deposits intermediation measure 
during the 2002 to 2008 period. This reflects an impact on bank intermediation by 
bank size, profitability and level of relationship with clients. 
 
The level of financial intermediation in SA has been low, negatively impacting on 
banks intermediation ability. However, low competition, conservative policies, 
relatively small bank size compared to global counterparts and concentrated 
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shareholding is likely to have also adversely affected banks’ financial intermediation 
during the 1993 to 2009 period. It is difficult to remedy many of these issues, with 
limits on shareholding likely to be too restrictive and difficult to enforce. Less 
stringent regulations could increase financial intermediaries’ intermediation potential, 
but may not have the desired effect as banks’ policies are prudentially meant to be 
conservative: therefore, less stringent regulations may destabilise the financial sector. 
Banking appears to have important economies of scale, but too large banks may create 
the problem of “too large to fail” firms, which may entail government assistance and 
implicit subsidy, as well as diminish competition. Higher levels of competition appear 
to be needed to bring down financial services costs and increase the scope of financial 
intermediation. 
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THE APPENDIX 
 
Chart I- Intermediation measure: loans to deposits for total banking industry, 
Absa Bank, Nedbank, Standard Bank of SA, Firstrand Bank and medium and 
small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
 
Chart II- Intermediation measure: loans to deposits for total banking industry, 
Absa Bank, Nedbank, Standard Bank of SA, Firstrand Bank, Investec Bank and 
medium and small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
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Chart III- Intermediation measure: loans to liabilities for total banking industry, 
Absa Bank, Nedbank, Standard Bank of SA, Firstrand Bank and medium and 
small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
 
Chart IV- Intermediation measure: loans to liabilities for total banking industry, 
Absa Bank, Nedbank, Standard Bank of SA, Firstrand Bank, Investec Bank and 
medium and small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
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Chart V- Intermediation measure: total assets less fixed assets and cash to 
deposits for the total banking industry, Absa Bank, Nedbank, Standard Bank of 
SA, Firstrand Bank and medium and small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
 
Chart VI- Intermediation measure: total assets less fixed assets and cash to 
liabilities for the total banking industry, Absa Bank, Nedbank, Standard Bank of 
SA, Firstrand Bank and medium and small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
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Chart VII- Intermediation measure: loans and deposits to total assets for the 
total banking industry, Absa Bank, Nedbank, Standard Bank of SA, Firstrand 
Bank and medium and small banks 
 
Source: Author’s computation, using data from the South African Reserve Bank 
 
 
Table I- Intermediation measures for total banking industry 
Total banking industry 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 96.71% 79.74% 124.69% 102.81% 151.98% 
1994 98.31% 80.64% 125.61% 103.04% 152.10% 
1995 97.39% 81.06% 124.09% 103.29% 152.89% 
1996 100.25% 81.23% 127.97% 103.70% 151.10% 
1997 97.56% 80.50% 126.36% 104.26% 151.34% 
1998 94.32% 78.30% 126.60% 105.09% 149.16% 
1999 95.30% 78.60% 128.35% 105.86% 147.79% 
2000 98.71% 79.45% 132.74% 106.85% 145.85% 
2001 100.17% 75.30% 142.69% 107.27% 137.24% 
2002 98.67% 80.00% 132.95% 107.78% 146.34% 
2003 97.97% 70.12% 149.07% 106.69% 130.57% 
2004 97.19% 73.01% 142.97% 107.39% 135.96% 
2005 98.10% 78.55% 133.55% 106.93% 146.15% 
2006 101.50% 81.76% 132.95% 107.09% 149.49% 
2007 101.99% 80.99% 135.00% 107.20% 147.66% 
2008 97.40% 70.74% 143.91% 104.52% 135.41% 
2009 95.78% 75.60% 133.65% 105.49% 144.21% 
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Table II- Intermediation measures for South Africa’s four largest banks 
South Africa’s four largest banks 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 98.96% 82.67% 122.48% 102.32% 155.86% 
1994 99.89% 82.83% 123.09% 102.07% 155.42% 
1995 98.34% 83.69% 119.76% 101.92% 158.03% 
1996 101.58% 82.19% 126.22% 102.13% 153.24% 
1997 99.97% 82.69% 123.83% 102.42% 155.23% 
1998 98.74% 83.70% 121.53% 103.02% 157.61% 
1999 96.89% 80.90% 123.86% 103.42% 153.24% 
2000 100.72% 80.75% 130.69% 104.77% 148.67% 
2001 102.10% 75.61% 142.40% 105.46% 138.12% 
2002 98.02% 78.57% 132.58% 106.27% 145.81% 
2003 97.88% 70.14% 147.75% 105.88% 131.33% 
2004 99.18% 73.34% 144.49% 106.86% 135.67% 
2005 100.03% 79.80% 133.48% 106.49% 147.39% 
2006 104.19% 83.41% 133.53% 106.89% 150.57% 
2007 103.64% 81.99% 135.01% 106.81% 148.64% 
2008 98.01% 71.69% 142.12% 103.96% 137.33% 
2009 97.85% 76.47% 134.17% 104.85% 144.92% 
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Table III- Intermediation measures for total small and medium banks (including 
fifth largest bank-Investec) 
Total small and medium banks (including fifth largest bank-Investec) 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 87.75% 68.78% 133.50% 104.63% 137.54% 
1994 92.57% 73.08% 134.74% 106.37% 140.81% 
1995 93.57% 71.53% 141.60% 108.24% 134.77% 
1996 95.46% 77.75% 134.28% 109.37% 143.64% 
1997 90.10% 73.78% 134.23% 109.90% 139.88% 
1998 83.33% 65.78% 139.22% 109.90% 130.33% 
1999 90.95% 73.03% 139.81% 112.26% 135.04% 
2000 93.82% 76.28% 137.70% 111.95% 139.24% 
2001 95.86% 74.58% 143.33% 111.51% 135.26% 
2002 100.55% 84.25% 134.02% 112.29% 147.86% 
2003 98.35% 69.99% 154.75% 110.13% 127.39% 
2004 87.80% 71.24% 135.75% 110.14% 137.43% 
2005 88.24% 72.00% 133.91% 109.27% 139.79% 
2006 87.89% 73.06% 130.05% 108.10% 143.82% 
2007 92.65% 75.16% 134.93% 109.47% 142.07% 
2008 93.87% 65.51% 154.31% 107.68% 125.02% 
2009 84.83% 70.68% 130.92% 109.08% 140.31% 
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Table IV- Intermediation measures for South Africa’s five largest banks 
South Africa’s five largest banks 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 98.73% 82.55% 122.62% 102.52% 155.55% 
1994 99.67% 82.63% 123.60% 102.47% 154.72% 
1995 97.94% 83.28% 120.43% 102.40% 157.00% 
1996 100.74% 81.68% 126.70% 102.73% 152.18% 
1997 99.15% 81.90% 124.41% 102.77% 154.01% 
1998 96.27% 81.54% 121.87% 103.22% 155.46% 
1999 95.21% 78.74% 125.33% 103.65% 150.46% 
2000 98.99% 79.11% 131.33% 104.96% 146.93% 
2001 100.85% 75.15% 142.65% 106.30% 137.24% 
2002 97.43% 78.72% 132.55% 107.10% 145.53% 
2003 97.76% 70.03% 148.76% 106.56% 130.53% 
2004 98.44% 73.52% 143.80% 107.40% 135.93% 
2005 98.97% 79.26% 133.47% 106.89% 146.78% 
2006 102.70% 82.65% 133.17% 107.16% 150.01% 
2007 102.19% 81.52% 134.25% 107.09% 148.55% 
2008 97.60% 72.00% 141.23% 104.18% 138.02% 
2009 96.50% 76.19% 133.09% 105.08% 145.25% 
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Table V- Intermediation measures for total small and medium banks (excluding 
fifth largest bank-Investec) 
Total small and medium banks (excluding fifth largest bank-Investec) 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 87.86% 68.30% 133.76% 103.98% 137.37% 
1994 92.81% 73.02% 133.71% 105.20% 142.08% 
1995 94.84% 71.86% 141.18% 106.97% 136.02% 
1996 98.18% 79.35% 133.32% 107.75% 146.64% 
1997 91.59% 75.23% 133.71% 109.83% 141.70% 
1998 88.02% 68.65% 141.88% 110.65% 131.24% 
1999 95.44% 78.45% 138.54% 113.89% 139.47% 
2000 97.78% 80.64% 137.37% 113.29% 142.37% 
2001 98.13% 75.78% 142.81% 110.29% 137.24% 
2002 103.63% 85.16% 134.52% 110.55% 149.56% 
2003 99.33% 70.67% 151.14% 107.52% 130.80% 
2004 88.16% 69.09% 136.96% 107.34% 136.17% 
2005 90.66% 72.46% 134.30% 107.34% 140.83% 
2006 91.27% 74.09% 131.12% 106.43% 144.94% 
2007 99.87% 75.71% 142.87% 108.30% 138.88% 
2008 95.24% 59.43% 172.42% 107.58% 112.47% 
2009 88.51% 69.62% 139.32% 109.59% 134.03% 
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Table VI- Intermediation measures for Absa Bank 
Absa Bank 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 101.74% 85.81% 121.36% 102.36% 160.24% 
1994 101.05% 86.94% 118.15% 101.65% 163.21% 
1995 101.43% 87.36% 118.62% 102.16% 163.04% 
1996 101.26% 84.12% 123.65% 102.71% 157.18% 
1997 100.69% 86.66% 119.46% 102.82% 161.76% 
1998 100.31% 87.86% 118.06% 103.41% 163.94% 
1999 99.76% 86.96% 118.24% 103.06% 161.76% 
2000 104.38% 88.10% 122.97% 103.80% 160.00% 
2001 105.64% 84.99% 129.16% 103.92% 153.57% 
2002 99.66% 85.70% 124.01% 106.64% 156.87% 
2003 105.67% 83.07% 135.54% 106.55% 148.19% 
2004 107.11% 87.80% 131.06% 107.43% 154.94% 
2005 108.20% 90.49% 127.21% 106.39% 160.67% 
2006 109.33% 92.67% 126.50% 107.23% 162.78% 
2007 107.45% 88.36% 129.85% 106.79% 157.27% 
2008 105.65% 80.83% 137.20% 104.97% 147.79% 
2009 103.71% 84.46% 129.80% 105.71% 154.35% 
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Table VII- Intermediation measures for Standard Bank of SA 
Standard Bank of SA 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 101.94% 83.57% 127.92% 104.86% 151.46% 
1994 97.68% 81.84% 124.35% 104.19% 152.61% 
1995 94.60% 80.47% 120.90% 102.84% 154.08% 
1996 103.17% 80.21% 130.76% 101.66% 149.05% 
1997 102.89% 80.38% 130.20% 101.71% 149.92% 
1998 99.85% 78.98% 130.07% 102.88% 148.59% 
1999 89.93% 75.64% 122.22% 102.79% 149.43% 
2000 96.96% 77.78% 133.39% 107.01% 142.77% 
2001 103.92% 82.01% 134.85% 106.42% 146.99% 
2002 101.54% 83.42% 128.32% 105.42% 153.33% 
2003 96.91% 58.73% 172.72% 104.68% 112.18% 
2004 101.05% 63.34% 168.49% 105.62% 117.89% 
2005 101.43% 71.34% 149.93% 105.46% 132.73% 
2006 106.78% 77.01% 147.16% 106.12% 138.78% 
2007 106.83% 76.65% 147.75% 106.00% 138.06% 
2008 99.14% 63.80% 159.49% 102.64% 123.38% 
2009 101.97% 70.56% 150.37% 104.06% 132.23% 
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Table VIII- Intermediation measures for Firstrand Bank 
Firstrand Bank 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 99.16% 78.37% 127.01% 100.38% 149.34% 
1994 112.11% 79.49% 141.55% 100.37% 141.51% 
1995 104.15% 81.40% 127.85% 99.92% 149.10% 
1996 106.97% 79.94% 134.76% 100.71% 144.59% 
1997 102.27% 79.14% 131.59% 101.84% 145.76% 
1998 99.97% 82.82% 123.57% 102.37% 153.67% 
1999 106.60% 77.92% 141.25% 103.26% 141.12% 
2000 104.14% 75.39% 141.83% 102.67% 139.26% 
2001 110.60% 63.86% 179.57% 103.69% 114.80% 
2002 104.72% 70.60% 154.91% 104.43% 129.58% 
2003 100.85% 72.97% 145.57% 105.32% 135.51% 
2004 99.55% 78.81% 135.34% 107.14% 144.98% 
2005 100.22% 81.80% 130.31% 106.36% 150.75% 
2006 103.69% 84.09% 131.77% 106.86% 151.90% 
2007 104.05% 81.26% 136.57% 106.66% 147.29% 
2008 96.83% 69.21% 145.24% 103.81% 133.28% 
2009 96.48% 74.26% 135.96% 104.65% 141.51% 
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Table IX- Intermediation measures for Nedbank 
Nedbank 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 89.87% 80.72% 112.74% 101.26% 161.60% 
1994 88.19% 80.37% 111.87% 101.96% 162.35% 
1995 91.45% 84.08% 111.51% 102.53% 165.36% 
1996 94.31% 84.46% 115.62% 103.55% 163.10% 
1997 92.57% 83.35% 114.94% 103.49% 163.00% 
1998 93.29% 84.58% 113.87% 103.25% 164.63% 
1999 91.58% 82.88% 116.10% 105.07% 161.14% 
2000 96.09% 80.37% 126.72% 105.99% 151.31% 
2001 86.23% 70.44% 133.37% 108.95% 136.72% 
2002 83.72% 72.55% 126.36% 109.49% 141.52% 
2003 88.81% 68.79% 138.40% 107.19% 133.59% 
2004 88.72% 67.61% 141.26% 107.65% 131.46% 
2005 88.75% 77.44% 124.08% 108.26% 149.36% 
2006 95.45% 80.86% 127.04% 107.63% 151.32% 
2007 94.37% 82.51% 123.83% 108.26% 154.69% 
2008 88.23% 75.80% 122.24% 105.03% 151.50% 
2009 87.24% 78.13% 117.52% 105.24% 156.61% 
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Table X- Intermediation measures for Investec Bank 
Investec Bank 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 86.38% 75.50% 130.28% 113.87% 139.72% 
1994 89.82% 73.74% 146.40% 120.19% 127.64% 
1995 83.32% 68.63% 144.95% 119.40% 124.86% 
1996 75.06% 64.93% 141.48% 122.39% 122.36% 
1997 80.91% 64.93% 137.48% 110.33% 129.01% 
1998 61.30% 51.32% 126.75% 106.12% 125.56% 
1999 72.64% 53.28% 144.97% 106.34% 117.77% 
2000 78.43% 60.45% 138.96% 107.10% 127.16% 
2001 86.36% 69.35% 145.51% 116.85% 127.08% 
2002 90.03% 80.84% 132.27% 118.77% 141.96% 
2003 96.06% 68.40% 163.24% 116.24% 119.94% 
2004 86.97% 76.83% 132.95% 117.44% 140.44% 
2005 83.92% 71.14% 133.21% 112.91% 137.92% 
2006 81.94% 71.13% 128.17% 111.26% 141.79% 
2007 82.71% 74.28% 124.02% 111.37% 147.15% 
2008 91.92% 77.08% 128.64% 107.88% 148.97% 
2009 80.05% 72.25% 120.01% 108.32% 149.84% 
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Table XI- Intermediation measures for United States of America commercial 
banks 
United States of America commercial banks 
Year 
Loans to 
deposits 
Loans to 
liabilities 
Total assets 
less fixed assets 
and cash to 
deposits 
Total assets less 
fixed assets and 
cash to 
liabilities 
Loans and 
deposits to 
total assets 
1993 91.37% 69.82% 124.60% 95.22% 134.39% 
1994 99.03% 71.43% 133.46% 96.27% 131.90% 
1995 104.16% 72.60% 138.43% 96.48% 130.43% 
1996 103.73% 73.81% 135.70% 96.55% 132.57% 
1997 103.15% 72.86% 136.22% 96.22% 131.15% 
1998 105.90% 72.75% 141.10% 96.94% 129.33% 
1999 106.06% 72.33% 140.94% 96.12% 128.81% 
2000 110.01% 73.78% 143.97% 96.56% 128.82% 
2001 102.81% 72.19% 137.18% 96.33% 129.30% 
2002 102.85% 70.96% 140.00% 96.59% 127.23% 
2003 100.97% 70.62% 138.96% 97.20% 127.15% 
2004 100.40% 71.64% 136.11% 97.12% 128.57% 
2005 102.76% 72.89% 137.58% 97.60% 129.40% 
2006 105.94% 74.12% 140.56% 98.35% 128.96% 
2007 108.44% 74.72% 142.83% 98.41% 128.71% 
2008 104.66% 67.90% 139.92% 90.78% 120.13% 
2009 89.37% 66.30% 120.47% 89.37% 124.60% 
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Table XII- Intermediation measures for financial sector 
Year 
Banks 
Long- and 
short-term 
insurers 
Pension and 
provident funds Unit trusts 
Marketable 
securities plus 
loans to total 
assets 
Marketable 
securities to 
total assets 
Marketable 
securities to 
total assets 
Marketable 
securities to 
total assets 
1992 75.62% 72.49% 82.38% 108.45% 
1993 80.91% 75.57% 80.75% 144.36% 
1994 80.02% 74.96% 81.87% 124.92% 
1995 82.20% 75.52% 79.35% 121.24% 
1996 80.96% 73.23% 78.55% 111.37% 
1997 80.38% 68.88% 79.20% 82.67% 
1998 80.99% 62.74% 81.30% 67.60% 
1999 78.38% 60.12% 84.48% 74.02% 
2000 78.57% 63.50% 84.46% 72.24% 
2001 74.11% 61.45% 86.62% 90.41% 
2002 71.95% 62.17% 86.99% 72.14% 
2003 77.41% 64.53% 88.75% 74.98% 
2004 79.85% 64.72% 87.57% 85.17% 
2005 78.13% 64.94% 88.72% 88.52% 
2006 77.88% 64.55% 87.83% 85.68% 
2007 77.71% 64.16% 86.75% 64.95% 
2008 81.85% 57.10% 83.75% 48.43% 
 
 
 
